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During DESERT STORM a serious shortfall was identified in the
communications architecture and its ability to effectively provide high-bandwidth
information to meet the demands of the operation. In response to this shortfall, the
Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuing the exploitation of commercial Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) technology and its ability to broadcast video and data at high
rates to small, affordable, and portable terminals. The Global Broadcast Service (GBS)
was initiated to ultimately provide this military direct broadcast capability.
A precursor to GBS, the Joint Broadcast Service (JBS), was begun as an
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). It is now leveraging DBS
technology to support Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. This thesis describes how the
JBS works, what types of information are sent over the JBS, the complete process of
information distribution, and the impact the JBS has had on Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR and the associated operational decision making process.
The JBS system has, at least in part, answered the joint warfighter's need for an
improved high-bandwidth video and data distribution system. Although it does have
force enhancement capabilities, the lack of familiarity, information management, and
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History should have taught us that there is never enough available
communications. The story of the soldier in Grenada making a personal credit card call
back to headquarters on a public telephone will be etched in military history books
forever as a grand example ofhow interservice parochialism and stovepipe systems lead
to a lack of communications interoperability that adversely affects a battlefield. Desert
Storm taught us another hard lesson about how inadequate our communications
capabilities are when compared to what we think we need. We have learned. We have
improved our interoperability and our capabilities, but we can never get enough
bandwidth.
The DoD has piggybacked on the advances of commercial industry in the area of
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) technology to open the floodgates of information a little
wider for the warfighter. Through the coordinated efforts ofmany commands, services,
agencies, and other organizations the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) Program was
initiated to provide a near-term increase in the military's wideband communications
capabilities. A prototype of the GBS, the Joint Broadcast Service, is an Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration program that was rapidly deployed as a major piece
of the Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation (BC2A) system. The JBS was used
by the United Nations Implementation Force (IFOR) in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR,
and is currently being used by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Operation JOINT
GUARD, in Bosnia.
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I began this research based on the premise that the JBS was being deployed to be
a valuable addition and provide immediate impact to the coalition forces in Bosnia. The
main thrust of the research dealt with the impact the use of the JBS had on forces
deployed to Bosnia. More specifically, I wanted to determine the impact this new
capability has had on the decision-making process at higher levels of command and its
effect on JOINT ENDEAVOR operations. Chapter I of this thesis provides a short
introduction, and Chapter n gives a brief history of the commercial DBS technology and
outlines the basics of the GBS as a basis for discussion. Chapters EQ, IV, and V present
an in-depth look at the JBS architecture, how it was used (specifics about the broadcast
such as information flow and availability, chssemination, and management), and the
effect it had on the operation itself and the associated decision making processes.
Chapter VI looks at the requirement for a theater injection capability, the advantages and
disadvantages oftwo possible solutions, and the prototype development effort for one of
those solutions. Finally, Chapter VE outlines the lessons learned from this research as
well as my conclusions and recommendations. Appendices A and B are included to
provide detailed information about files broadcast via JBS and the information
management procedures for the BC2A.
The JBS system has, at least in part, answered the joint warfighter's need for an
improved high-bandwidth video and data distribution system. It provides the ability to
broadcast full fidelity video, imagery, and data at high rates to small, affordable, and
portable terminals throughout the theater.
As stated above, I began this research looking at the JBS as a new operational
tool for the warfighter that would be a major player in providing Information
xx
Dominance. However, as I got deeper into my research I realized that the JBS is not a
well-developed system that was designed from the ground up for the military. It is a
rapid prototype technology demonstration program and its primary role is to prove
concepts and gain valuable experience to be applied toward the GBS program. Its
secondary role is to provide a new tool for the forward deployed troops to use in their
operations. Based on the results ofmy research, as summarized in this thesis, I
determined that the JBS has performed its primary role superbly and its secondary role
adequately.
Although JBS does have force enhancement capabilities, there is a collection of
several things that have limited its effectiveness in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (as
detailed in Chapters V and VII).
As the JBS continues to be used and improved the users will begin to recognize
the capabilities it brings to the fight. The bottom line is that the JBS is not a panacea and
does not solve our communications problems, but it is a definite success and its




Information and information delivery systems are essential elements of combat
capability. In spite of this realization military leaders have never had all of the
information they felt they needed. Technology has greatly expanded the sophistication
and capabilities of communications in an effort to provide access to more information.
Having information superiority (more information than your enemy) can be critical to
victory on the battlefield. Achieving information dominance goes beyond mere
information superiority. To reach the DoD's goal of Information Dominance the military
relies on having better technology and faster information delivery systems.
Commercial industry has pioneered the development of Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS) technology that has become very popular in the television market. Capitalizing on
commercial successes, the military has adapted DBS technology to meet the information
needs of the military. This technology provides high volume information flow to any
user with the appropriate receive equipment within the satellite broadcast coverage area
(footprint). The military adaptation of this technology known as the Global Broadcast
Service (GBS) will deliver a high-speed, one-way (for now 1 ) information flow of video,
imagery, and data to units worldwide. This will allow existing and planned two-way
communications systems to support the lower volume, two-way traffic for they which
they were designed.
The Joint Broadcast Service (JBS) is an operationally deployed test-bed for the
1 Asymmetric back-channel technology being developed allows the DBS transponder to share a small
amount of the downlink bandwidth for use in uplinking data from the DBS receive sites.
GBS used to support the United Nations (UN) operation in Bosnia. This thesis describes
how the JBS works, what types of information are being sent via the JBS, the complete
process of information distribution, and the impact the JBS has had on Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR and the associated decision making processes. The thesis then presents
lessons learned, recommendations, and conclusions that are based on the results of this
research.
I began this research based on the premise that the JBS was being deployed to be
a valuable addition and provide immediate impact to the coalition forces in Bosnia. The
methods used in gathering information for this research included personal interviews
with individuals in many organizations involved in the development and fielding of the
JBS, as well as some of the actual users of the system and its information products.
Additionally, an extensive review of government documents, reports, and open source
literature was conducted as part of this research effort.
Operation Desert Storm highlighted the need for more high-rate and high-
bandwidth communications. The commercially developed DBS technology was
exploited to provide this solution thanks to the coordinated efforts of many organizations.
The next chapter will provide a detailed background on direct broadcast technology and
the GBS. Chapter HI discusses the Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation (BC2A)
initiative and the JBS architecture. Chapter IV details JBS information operations -
information types, availability, and processes. Chapter V presents the results of my
research with regard to the impact of JBS on Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and its
associated decision making processes. Chapter VI provides a high level review of
Theater Injection Point (TIP) requirements and TIP prototype development efforts.
Finally, Chapter VII outlines the lessons learned from this research as well as my
conclusions and recommendations. Appendix A is included to give detailed information
about the files broadcast over JBS and the availability of the JBS system not provided in
the body of the thesis. Appendix B is a reproduction of the Information Management
Annex to the BC2A Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

II. BACKGROUND
This chapter gives a brief history of the commercial DBS technology and outlines
the basics of the GBS including its beginnings and development plans as a basis for
discussion.
A. DIRECT BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY
Satellite broadcasting has been around for nearly twenty years. In 1 976, the first
C-band home satellite TV system was put into service in California [Ref. 1]. Those C-
band systems required large and expensive antennas to receive broadcasts from local and
national TV companies. Because these broadcasts were often illegally received, the TV
companies started encrypting their signals, thus requiring the additional expense of
decryption equipment.
The rapid growth of C-band receive only systems indicated a large potential
demand for direct-to-home (DTH) satellite broadcasting, so the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocated the 12.2-1 2.7GHz band for DTH use. Then,
in 1982, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authorized DTH operations
and orbital slots and licenses were issued [Ref. 1].
The first commercial television DBS from a dedicated provider, using a leased
Canadian satellite transponder, was implemented in 1984 by United Satellite
Communication Inc (USCI). This venture failed because the company was unable to
attract more than seven thousand customers, primarily due to the expense of the large
satellite receive terminals [Ref. 1].
Several key technological barriers have been overcome to provide a commercially
viable method for satellite television broadcasting to subscribers. These successes
include high signal quality (CD quality audio and laser disk quality video), small receive
antennas, and inexpensive equipment for the customer.
In a 1994 joint venture, United States Satellite Broadcasting (USSB) and
DirecTV {a. Hughes subsidiary) established a successful DBS operation for customers in
the continental United States (CONUS). This system uses a three satellite constellation
with broadcast centers in Castle Rock, CO and Oakdale, MN. The three satellites
provide up to 200 channels of high quality television services received by 1 8" subscriber
terminals (costing less than $700 each). This joint venture was so successful that over
one million subscriber terminals were sold in the first year of operations [Ref. 1 ].
As a consumer of vast amounts of information, the potential benefits of direct
broadcast technology for the military are huge. Although military requirements are
substantially different from the commercial sector, a military direct broadcast capability
is ideally suited to the Department of Defense's (DoD) need for affordable and capable
bandwidth. In a 1994 study entitled Information Architecturefor the Battlefield, the
Defense Science Board (DSB) made this recommendation:
To enhance the information services available to the CINC, component
commanders and deployed warfighting forces, the [DSB] Task Force
recommends that the BITF [Battlefield Information Task Force] explore
the utility of a Direct Broadcast Satellite service. [Ref. 3]
The high data rates and large bandwidth associated with these types of satellites provide
one-way transmission of imagery, television, and data to a variety of users. The DoD has
taken this technology and developed a concept known as the GBS.
B. GLOBAL BROADCAST SERVICE (GBS)
The military's concept for GBS uses these same commercial technologies to
deliver high rate data, imagery, and video products quickly to the warfighter using a
small receive antenna. The Joint Broadcast Service (JBS) is a limited operational
capability being used as a testbed in support of GBS Phase I development (discussed
later).
There has been an alarming gap between military satellite communications
requirements and the capabilities that are currently available. This gap will be narrowed
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Figure 1. Future Requirements vs. MILSATCOM Capabilities [Ref. 9]

Secretary of Defense (Space), recognized this gap and made the following statement.
In the SATCOM arena, we can no longer afford to go our own way and
use commercial SATCOM as an afterthought. We've got to plan it as part
of the answer up-front to make sure it fits with both the rest of our space
architecture and the rest of our communications architecture. [Ref. 3]
Desert Storm highlighted the need for improved high-bandwidth communications
to support deployed forces because of the failure of existing military satellite
communications to do so. The shortfalls of the military communications architecture and
the supporting civilian communications systems in providing responsive, high-capacity
communications to deployed, mobile tactical units were highlighted in The Conduct of
the Persian GulfWar- The Final Report to Congress [Ref. 2].
Most of the information received in theater during Desert Storm (DS) was flown
in by aircraft. It was estimated that a communications capacity of 1 gigabit per second
would have been required to keep up with the information demands experienced in DS.
By the year 201 0, that number is expected to be nearly 1 gigabits per second [Ref. 3].
Table 1 provides some statistics on communications capabilities during some historic
U.S. conflicts.
1. GBS Beginnings
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a Joint Mission Need Statement (MNS), in
May 1995, which outlined the basic reasons the DoD needs a global broadcast capability
and also delineated the high-level operational requirements for the GBS concept. The
Joint MNS included the following requirements [Ref. 2]:

Year Conflict Communications Capacity
:.'.:* *>
1865 Civil War Telegraph 30 wpm
1915 World War I Telegraph 30wpm
1965 Vietnam Teletype 450 wpm
1991 Desert Storm 128 Kbps 192,000 wpm
1995 Bosnia 512 Kbps 768,000 wpm
1996 JBS in Bosnia 24.8 Mbps 37,200,000 wpm
Table 1. Information Transfer - Rate of Change [Ref. 4]
• "High speed, [one-way and near-real-time] multimedia communications and
information flow to garrisoned forces and to in-transit and deployed mobile
forces"
• "CENC and CJTF theater injection of information onto the broadcast"
• Use "small, lightweight, and inexpensive antennas and receivers"
• Use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and "non-developmental items (NDI)
to the greatest extent possible"
• It "must be compatible and integrated with existing and planned in theater and
centralized C4I systems such as . . . DISN"
• Must "accommodate broadcast transmission of all levels of information, from
UNCLAS up to and including SCI."
On 3 August 1995 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed
and approved the MNS. A draft GBS CONOPS was then prepared and published for the
JCS by the US Space Command in Aug 95 (a new version is currently being reviewed by
the Joint Staff). The CONOPS "gives an overall picture of broadcast operations based on
(1) a clear vision for improved information dissemination; (2) a system description; and

(3) an integrated approach for effective resource utilization and interoperability" [Ref. 5].
As opposed to the MNS, the CONOPS does go into high level explanations regarding the
system architecture, broadcast services, transmission operations, system management,
user operations, and roles and responsibilities. Figure 2 shows a graphical depiction of
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Figure 2. GBS Operational Concept [Ref. 7]
The GBS Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD), written by the
Army in 1995 (the latest version is dated 7 April 1997), briefly summarizes key points in
the MNS and CONOPS, but was primarily written to specify many system requirements
and performance parameters needed to aid in the acquisition process.
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While the above documents were being finalized, a variety ofDBS
demonstrations were performed to evaluate the potential of this GBS concept. The first
of these demonstrations, named Radiant Storm, was sponsored by the Navy Tactical
Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) office. Radiant Storm demonstrated the
ability to deliver commercial video and encrypted data to a remote user at T-l rates
(1 .544 Mbps) using a leased commercial DBS transponder, an 1 8" antenna dish, and a
commercial DBS receiver box. Building on this success, the TENCAP sponsored
Special Project '95 demonstration during the Roving Sands exercise was the first
broadcast to deployed units and also the first time that data management software was
used. This demonstration differed from Radiant Storm by using a non-DBS satellite, a
different frequency band, lower transmit power, and a 1 meter dish antenna but provided
a higher overall data rate. Next, HQ AFC4A demonstrated the use of the full 23 Mbps
broadcast capability and the use of Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) in the DBS
environment. Capitalizing on the use ofATM, the Joint Warrior Interoperability
Demonstration (JWID) '95 encrypted an ATM broadcast and demonstrated "the
interoperability of GBS technology with the current DoD communications architectures:
Defense Information System Network (DISN) and the Defense Information"
Infrastructure (DII) [Ref. 3].
As a result of these successes, in November 1995, about $900M in funding was
allocated and a GBS Joint Program Office (JPO) established to manage the program,
with the Air Force being named the lead agency/service for program development [Ref.
6].
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2. GBS Development Plans
The development of the objective GBS capability will evolve through a three-
phased approach. Phase 1 is a limited demonstration phase (FY96 - FY98). The focus of
Phase 1 is [Ref. 3]:
• "Acquire and provide a limited off-the-shelf commercial capability to support
selected exercises and concept development"
• "Initiate acquisition of the GBS space, ground, and user segments"
• "Determine products and applications which best suit" the CINC and
subordinate JTF Commanders
• Develop information management tools and algorithms
• Further refine the CONOPS and initiate connectivity from information
sources to GBS.
In support of these goals, one set of testbed equipment is being used to provide
operational support to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. This interim capability
is named the JBS and is part of a larger effort providing communications support to
United Nations (UN) forces in Bosnia. This 'larger effort' is known as the BC2A
Initiative and is managed by the BC2A JPO. The JBS portion of the BC2A is the focus
of this thesis and will be discussed extensively in later chapters.
Phase 2 will provide an interim military GBS capability (FY98 - FY06+). In
addition to incorporating the lessons learned from Phase 1 , the focus of Phase 2 will be
[Ref. 5]:
• "Launch Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Follow-on (UFO) satellites 8, 9, and
10 with hosted GBS packages"
12
• Acquire user receive suites and continue to develop information and broadcast
management systems
• Continue working to meet CINC and JTF Commanders' needs
• "Integrate GBS with MILSATCOM architecture and the DH"
• Complete connectivity to information providers and develop tools needed to
integrate GBS with GCCS.
As stated above, UFO satellites 8, 9, and 10 will replace their originally planned SHF
Fleet Broadcast transponders with GBS (EHF band) transponders and be designated as
UFO/G satellites. The proposed modifications will give each UFO/G satellite:
• Two steerable 24 Mbps spot beams, each with a footprint of 500 nautical
miles (nm) in diameter
• One steerable 1 .544 Mbps wide area beam with a footprint of 2000 nm in
diameter
• One fixed uplink antenna to receive data from the primary injection point
• One steerable uplink antenna to receive data from a theater injection point.
The Phase 2 design is not yet finalized, but these modifications would support the
potential configuration shown in Figure 3.
The proposed GBS payloads for the UFO/G satellites, in the above configuration,
gives each satellite a total coverage area of approximately 3.5 million square nautical
miles [Ref. 5]. One potential drawback is that the UFO/G satellites will be launched into
orbits of 4°-6° inclination requiring a satellite tracking capability at each receive site.




















12-foot Terminal 24-inch Rx-only User Terminals
Figure 3. GBS Phase 2 Potential Configuration [Ref. 5]
Phase 3 will be the "Objective System" - the full-up GBS capability (FY06+).
Based on the foundation laid by Phase 2 operations and user segment development, Phase
3 will [Ref. 5]:
• "Achieve objective capability"
• "Complete acquisition of space, ground, and user segments"
• "Complete integration with GCCS and other theater information management
systems."
This Phase 3 system will provide worldwide coverage in the military Ka frequency band
(30 GHz; uplink/20 GHz downlink). Each satellite will have 7 steerable spot beams and a
wide area coverage beam providing a maximum of270 Mbps [Ref. 7].
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Figure 4. GBS Phase 2 Coverage [Ref. 5]
The GBS is expected to support US Allies and Coalition Forces engaged in two
Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) worldwide. Being a global broadcast service, its
boundaries begin "at the interface with information providers and ends with the interface
to the warfighters in their operational environment" [Ref. 5]. Figure 5 is a graphical
representation of these boundaries.
GBS will be a system of broadcast managers, injection points, broadcast
satellites, and receiver terminals, as well as Operational Control and
Management (OCM) processes for requesting and coordinating the
distribution of information products .... GBS will be an integral part of
the overall DOD MILSATCOM Architecture and the larger Defense




























The JBS is based on the same commercial DBS technology as GBS and plans to
utilize the same type of "smart push/user pull" design as GBS to, hopefully, avoid
'information overload' to the end user. JBS broadcasts one-way, high bandwidth
multimedia information to 29 receive sites throughout the European theater. However, to
understand the JBS concept and architecture, we must first understand the BC2A
initiative since JBS is a major component of the larger BC2A umbrella.
A. BOSNIA COMMAND AND CONTROL AUGMENTATION (BC2A)
The purpose ofthe BC2A is to achieve battlefield information dominance. "For
this concept to be successful, one needs a unified integrated communication networking
system, and that's really the objective of the Bosnian Command and Control
Augmentation Program" [Ref. 3].
Air Force Manual 3-1 states "[Information] that would influence an operation or
program is worthless if the commander receives it after the opportunity has passed, an
irreversible decision has been made, or an operation is completed" [Ref. 10]. To support
Operation DENY FLIGHT (the operation to protect the airspace over Bosnia during the
spring and summer of 1 995), several initiatives were undertaken to overcome the
communications shortfall caused by large imagery and data files. The JBS was one of
these initiatives designed to speed the flow of important information to the decision-
maker. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) helped consolidate all of these efforts into a single
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initiative - BC2A. The stated objective of this initiative is to "support the Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR warfighter with timely and effective command and control
information" [Ref. 11]. The BC2A system overview, as described in the BC2A
CONOPS, is as follows:
BC2A improves the exchange of information between force components
deployed in the JOINT ENDEAVOR Area of Operations, command and
control posts in the European theater, and government and military
information sources in theater and in the continental United States
(CONUS). It provides communications links as well as the computer
hardware and software required to get vital information to the warfighter
more rapidly than is possible with the existing architecture. BC2A
capabilities are intended to augment rather than replace the existing
theater command and control infrastructure with advanced, commercially
available technologies. BC2A provides near-real-time, simultaneous
dissemination of information down to the Brigade/Wing command levels
along with advanced software tools to better manage this information. In
addition, BC2A provides a field test-bed for components of the
communications architecture that will ultimately be provided by the
Global Broadcast Service (GBS). [Ref. 11]
The main components of the BC2A consist of the Defense Information Systems Network
-Leading Edge Services (DISN - LES), Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), and the
JBS. These BC2A components are shown in Figure 6.
1. Defense Information Systems Network - Leading Edge Services
As shown in Figure 6, DISN-LES is a 45 Mbps (T3) fiber optic link providing
two-way connectivity among RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom; Fort Belvoir, VA;
many different information sources in the continental United States; supporting CINCs;
and the Pentagon. This fiber optic link is capable of transmitting high bandwidth video
























EUCOM InfoMgt Center (EIMC)
Stuttgart-Vaihingen
Figure 6. BC2A Architecture [Ref. 12]
2. Very Small Aperture Terminals
Although it also delivers a relatively high bandwidth capability, VSAT differs
from JBS in that it is limited to a small number (eight) of receive sites and that it
provides a responsive two-way capability. This system uses leased satellite transponders,
transmit/receive equipment, and a 2.4 meter dish antenna to allow two-way high
bandwidth communications between each of the eight sites. VSAT serves a critical role
in the distribution ofUnmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance video (e.g.,
Predator) by providing a satellite link to the Theater Injection Site (TIS) for subsequent
broadcast through JBS. One of the most important things about VSAT, according to
EUCOM personnel, is the video teleconferencing and whiteboard capability that allows
interactive distributed collaborative planning.
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B. JOINT BROADCAST SERVICE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The JBS is an integral part of the BC2A. It became operational on 6 Apr 96 and
had a total of 9 receive sites (5 ground and 4 ships). This initial capability had one US
SECRET Internet Protocol (IP) 2 Mbps data channel [Ref. 13] and four 4 Mbps high
quality full motion video channels [Ref. 4]. By 1 Aug 96, a 2 Mbps REL-NATO IP data
channel was added and later upgraded to the NATO SECRET level [Ref. 13]. Today
there are 29 JBS receive sites in EUCOM's AOR supporting Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR using an aggregate of nearly 30 Mbps.
The JBS has three primary segments: (1) the broadcast segment, (2) the terminal
(receive) segment, and (3) the space segment.
1. Broadcast Segment
The broadcast segment includes the Joint Information Management Center
(JIMC), located at the Pentagon, and a Theater Information Manager (TIM) for each
theater (for JBS this is the EUCOM Information Management Center (EIMC) located at
Stuttgart, Germany). The JIMC retrieves information products from national and theater
information sources. These products are then stored and added to a product catalog,
making them available upon request to support "user pull." The EIMC also develops
dissemination policies and priorities for its area of responsibility, including "approving
the JBS video broadcast schedule and channel allocations" [Ref. 12].
The Broadcast Management Center (BMC), co-located with the JIMC at the
Pentagon, is the point where data sources are injected onto the broadcast (on a modified
first-in, first-out (FIFO) basis) using the Internet Protocol (IP) and Asynchronous
Transfer Mode (ATM). "The BMC receives information to be broadcast from the JIMC,
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sets the uplink schedule, and uplinks that information to the satellite" [Ref. 12]. Two
classes of data are supported - IP data files from sources via the SEPRNET and streaming
data inputs (streaming data is a continuous stream of video/data received at the BMC and
packetized for broadcast, e.g., processed TRAP and TIBS data). "Operators at the BMC
are able to modify the precedence of files in the queue, pause their transmission, remove
them from the broadcast, or change the order of files within the precedence level" [Ref.
13].
2. Terminal (Receive) Segment
The basic JBS Receive Suite at a receive node consists of a 1 meter
antenna with processing and display hardware packaged in four protective
cases weighing a total of 500 lb. and occupying 60 cubic feet . . . Sites
with simultaneous viewing requirements receive an extra television and
[Integrated Receiver Decoder] IRD. Sites with multiple-level security
requirements have separate receive data equipment strings and separate
KEYMAT . . . This suite can simultaneously process two channels: one
unclassified video with encrypted dual-channel . . . and one encrypted data
channel. An Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) is included to provide
power conditioning and allow 5 minutes for graceful system shutdown . .
.
Each JBS receive suite consists of: 1 meter antenna, Low Noise Block
(LNB), Integrated Receiver Decoder (IRD), TV, VCR, KG-94A, Data
Bridge, CISCO router, SPARC 20 workstation, and Receive Data
Manager (RDM) software. [Ref. 13]
The JBS receive suite comes in one oftwo configurations - JBS receive only
(video and data) or JBS video receive only. The video receive only version comes with
only enough equipment to receive video (i.e., IRD, TV, VCR, and antenna) - "it is
physically incapable of receiving the data portion of the JBS broadcast" [Ref. 11].
As noted above, each receive suite can be slightly different based upon the
desired capabilities at the site. These differences in capabilities are accommodated by
including modular containers with additional equipment. Figure 7 shows the JBS receive
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suite with the additional equipment needed to allow the site to store information and act
as a small information server.




Figure 7. JBS Receive Equipment [Ref. 15]
The IRD, sometimes referred to as a 'set top box,' is the key element of the JBS
receive suite that has enabled the low cost, portable, state-of-the-art functionality [Ref.
13].
The IRD (about the size and weight of a standard VCR) provides MPEG2
processing of digitized video and outputs to a standard NTSC TV.
Additionally, the IRD can output high speed data to an 8 bit wide parallel
port. These functions cannot occur simultaneously. Therefore, an IRD
must be dedicated to each broadcast channel required for simultaneous,
constant use. The IRDs used for JBS are specifically modified to
eliminate the conditional access and DES encryption systems normally
found in an off-the-shelf IRD. [Ref. 13]
As opposed to the 18" antenna for commercial direct broadcast television, the 1
meter JBS receive antenna helps overcome potential co-channel interference from
adjacent satellites. The larger antenna also makes up for the slightly weaker signal
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Figure 8. JBS Receive Sites [Ref. 15]
3. Space Segment
The JBS uses a leased Ku band transponder on the Orion Atlantic- 1 satellite,
located at 37.5° west longitude, to provide European spot beam coverage [Ref. 13]. The
Orion- 1 satellite provides an antenna to receive the uplink from the Pentagon and is
capable of delivering a 30.3 Mbps broadcast signal to the European theater.
The uplink frequency is 14.281 GHz with a maximum uplink power of 300 watts
from a 3.7 meter center fed reflector mounted on the rooftop ofthe Pentagon [Ref. 13].
The downlink signal into USEUCOM is at 1 1.483 GHz and is horizontally polarized,
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The downlink signal into USEUCOM is at 1 1 .483 GHz and is horizontally polarized,
providing a power output on the earth's surface that ranges from 49 dBw (Adriatic Sea &
Italy) to 39 dBw (UK, Central Europe, central Mediterranean Sea) as shown in Figure 9
[Ref. 13].
These three segments (broadcast, receive, and space) make up the Joint Broadcast
Service that allows data and imagery products to be delivered to the warfighter in a more
timely manner than is otherwise possible. The use of proven COTS technology and small
receive antennas has kept the overall costs down and allow tactical and other
'communications challenged' users to have access to JBS capabilities.
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Figure 9. JBS Satellite Coverage [Adapted from Ref. 13 & Ref. 38]
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Since JBS is a one-way broadcast capability, how does the user specify what
information is needed? The JBS concept employs the "smart push/warrior pull" idea
espoused in nearly all of the 'C4I For The Warrior" documentation. This concept,
including the actual information flow in the Bosnia Theater (from push/request to
receipt) and types of information available, will be addressed in the next chapter.
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IV. JBS INFORMATION OPERATIONS
One of the most important lessons learned from DESERT STORM was that the
U.S. Armed Forces did not have adequate communications capabilities to handle the
information requirements in theater. It was very difficult, if not impossible, to
disseminate large products (e.g., imagery and the Air Tasking Order (ATO)) to the
necessary users within the theater of operations. This was not only due to the lack of
communications resources but also to the lack of standardized file types. Additionally,
because simultaneously sending to multiple users (multicasting) was not usually possible
distribution of standard products to many users required multiple retransmissions over
dedicated communications links. This caused many links to be unavailable for other uses
for long periods of time. Thus, the true stories of aircraft flying copies of the ATO to
users on a daily basis and the need for three C-5 aircraft to fly copies of the
Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI) into the theater for further
dissemination [Ref. 16].
The use of DBS technology now makes broadcast transmission of high bandwidth
information to the warfighter possible. Figure 10 shows a theoretical data throughput
comparison of various systems. Because of JBS, full fidelity video, imagery, and data
can be multicast throughout the theater for direct exploitation by the warfighter. This
chapter will discuss JBS in terms of information flow and availability, dissemination
after receipt, and management.
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A. INFORMATION FLOW AND AVAILABILITY
Any number of different agencies (e.g., DISA, NIMA), combatant commands
(e.g., EUCOM, CENTCOM), and commercial sources (e.g., CNN) can generate data or
video for broadcast on JBS, at the SECRET level or below, in support of Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR. With the vast array of information producers available, the user
must to carefully determine the information requirements needed to accomplish their
specific mission. The user must be able to readily obtain accurate information and not
have to wade through virtual 'piles' of information that were 'pushed' on the user. As an
example, late in 1996, "it was common for 100-200 files to be pushed a day" [Ref. 12]
and operators would have to manually search through these files to find the ones that
they needed.

































9.65 days 9.92 hr 1.09 hr 21.59 min 1.45 min
Original Datafrom NRO
These numbers refer strictly to information content and do not account for encryption, error correction,
wrapping, or overhead bits which can vary depending on the transmission system used. Transmission
times calculated using: [8 data bits per byte * message size] / system throughput
Figure 10. Data Throughput Comparison [Ref. 17]
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Although "All information is broadcast with an identifying wrapper that allows
receiving sites to ignore information in which they are not interested and thus prevent
information overload" [Ref. 11], it doesn't really work very well for 'pushed'
information. There is a growing feeling among users that there is no such thing as a
'smart push.' Instead, many are advocating a subscription policy for standard products
that will be broadcast on a regular basis. With this concept users would receive only
those products that they have specifically requested because the products would be
specifically addressed to the users with a subscription. This allows the users to better
manage their assets and avoid getting buried by 'Pentagon-Pushed' information that may
be useless to the individual user. Under the 'Smart Push (or Subscription)/Warrior Pull'
concept, JBS provides two types of service and three product delivery classes.
The two types of service are: Inter-theater and Intra-theater. Inter-theater service
refers to the flow of information from the CONUS to EUCOM via broadcast over the
Orion satellite. Inter-theater service is handled in the following manner. Based on a
received information requirement, the JIMC requests the information from one of its
various information sources. After securing the information, the JIMC coordinates with
the BMC to queue the information for a future broadcast. The information is then sent
via the DISN-LES to the BMC, uplinked to the Orion satellite, and then broadcast to
receive terminals throughout the European Theater.
Intra-theater services (EIMC) focuses on information from
USCINCEUR/JOINT ENDEAVOR sources to component/sub-component
levels. Intra-theater sources must be moved from the USEUCOM Area of
Operations to the CONUS for incorporation into the JBS broadcast. [Ref.
B]
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Intra-theater service refers to the broadcast of information that originates from
within the theater such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video, reconnaissance
imagery, and ATOs created at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Italy.
This information must be sent to the Theater Injection Point (TIP) at RAF Molesworth,
UK. The TIP has equipment and "software capable ofwrapping data files for direct
injection into the JBS" [Ref. 1 9]. From there it is shipped to the BMC, via the trans-
Atlantic DISN-LES link, uplinked to the Orion satellite, and finally broadcast back to
receive terminals in the European Theater. This is known as a virtual injection capability
since the TIP does not have a direct uplink capability to the Orion satellite.
The three classes of product delivery are: Continuous and Periodic
(Push/Subscription), and On-demand (Pull).
Continuous and Periodic (Push) Products. These broadcasts may be
CINC, Service, or Agency-unique and are available to all JBS-equipped
units in the broadcast footprint. The JBS is a primary means of moving
time-sensitive, high-volume sensor data in near-real-time to other sensor
systems for tip-off and queuing, and to theater and tactical intelligence
and analysis activities for rapid exploitation. Additional examples of the
[pushed] data may include:
Operations ~ Air Tasking Order (ATO), global weather, imagery,
unclassified UAV video, local weather forecasts,
ELINT warning.
Intelligence - Daily intelligence briefings, intelligence updates,
and imagery composites.
Administrative — Message traffic requiring broad dissemination,
education/training, payroll, medical.
Logistics — Inventories, asset visibility.
MWR — News, training/education, AFRTS, Stars & Stripes,
Early Bird.
Other services specified by USCINCEUR. [Ref. 13]
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On-Demand (Pull) products refers to the ability of JBS users to order specific
information products from the JIMC for receipt via a future broadcast. These specific
requests may or may not be for products in the product catalog. Requests are made
electronically via the DISN-LES as depicted in Figure 11 (1-2, information request; 3-4,
request acknowledged; 5-7, information is obtained and broadcast to site; 8, site
acknowledges receipt) or they can be made directly to the JIMC via fax, phone, teletype,
or whatever other communication means the user has. Details of this process can be

















DISN-LES - OCONUS LINK
Figure 11. Possible Method for Product Request [Ref. 11]
Since there are many products competing for the bandwidth provided by JBS it
has been divided into a few separate areas for use. All products will be broadcast under
one of the headings shown in the Table 2. The products available to the warfighter on
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either a push/subscription or as-requested basis are shown in Table 3 (shows only those
products with UNCLASSIFIED titles). Additional products are added to this list on a
regular basis. Those products that are available on a subscription basis are sent to the
users based on a broadcast schedule that is developed by the BMC. Additional




CNN 3 Mbps 256 kbps
AFRTS 3 Mbps 256 kbps
Predator (UAV) 3 Mbps
OSD Press Briefing 1.5 Mbps 128 kbps
US Secret IP Tunnel 3 Mbps
NATO Secret IP Tunnel 1 .6 Mbps
US & NATO Secret ATM 13.2 Mbps
Program Guide 200 kbps
Table 2. JBS Bandvildth Allocations Ref. 20]
B. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Lieutenant General William J. Donahue, Air Staff Director of C3 Systems, stated:
We see a huge information appetite in future weapon systems and support
functions. Just-in-time logistics, intelligence, command and control - all
these are driving information requirements up big-time. But we'd rather
move information than move support troops to the field. [Ref. 3]
GBS, and therefore JBS, was envisioned to be a communications system that
would provide a satellite communications capability to the 'disadvantaged' user (e.g.,
light, mobile forces). The "C4I For The Warrior" concept spawned the phrase 'C4I To
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The Foxhole' as that was the advertised plan. Someday this may happen, but not yet.
JBS is still a tool for commanders and their staffs.
Because the number ofJBS receive terminals is still limited they are not supplied
to lower echelon units, and their size makes it difficult for dismounted infantry or Special
JIMC Daily Broadcast Product Catalog
Daily Balkan Intelligence Summary Theater Intelligence Digest
Balkan Graphic INTSUM JAC EUCOM Intelligence Report
Heavy Weapons Baseline Air Order of Battle
Defensive Missile Order of Battle Electronic Order of Battle
Ground Order of Battle Naval Order of Battle
JAC Western Algerian Situational
Analytical Summary
JAC Terrorism-Counter Intelligence Force
Protection Summary
Parametric Electronic Order of Battle Commander's Intelligence Update - "Pinks'
Daily DIA/NMJIC J2 Brief Chairman's Daily Operations Brief
Daily DIA/NMJIC Executive Highlights Daily DIA/NMJIC Overnight Developments
BC2A Daily Site Status Report NMCC Daily Briefing
CNN, USA Today and IGES Weather for
Europe
Airfield Summary Information
12-24 Hour Surface and Flight Forecasts 24-48 Hour Surface and Flight Forecasts
AFGWC Forecasts 72 Hour Forecasts
Naval Weather Forecasts Today's Conditions
6
th
Fleet Forecasts METOC Weather from Rota, Spain
Satellite Images - Visual and IR LRC Morning Update
Early Bird Stars and Stripes
Times Fax SIRO Daily Press Review
Table 3. Product Catalog [Ref. 18]
Operations Forces (SOF) teams to use them. The bottom line is that JBS is not currently
available to 'users on the move' or lower level units. It is being used as a large
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bandwidth pipe to get imagery, intelligence, and other products to planners and analysts
and news and briefings to commanders and staff.
In some cases, the JBS equipment is tied into the Local Area Network (LAN)
which vastly increases the potential number of users of the information. However, this
assumes local users know it is there and know how to get to it. In most cases, JBS
communications equipment is not connected to the LAN, and it's a new system that
people are not familiar with so they don't use it. A recently released report from a
Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force states, "There is a tremendous amount of
information that never gets to users, because they don't know where to find it and don't
have effective tools." Also, "Critical intelligence was not getting to lower-echelon U.S.
forces in Bosnia while field commanders were at times overwhelmed by a torrent of
useless information." Thus, outside of the primary group of users (i.e., commanders,
staff, planners, and analysts) there is very little dissemination of JBS products. [Ref. 21]
Additionally, working in a multi-national coalition environment adds its own
twist because of cultural differences. For example, some nations disagree with the very
premise of a broadcast system because they like to maintain a close hold on information.
Whether this is due to habit, cultural background, security concerns, a desire to have
higher headquarters be the repository of information, or some other reason is irrelevant;
if the military leadership of another country (especially in the multi-national division
(MND) arrangement used in Bosnia) does not believe that information should be shared
freely, the whole system is rendered less effective and gives the coalition an information
reservoir instead of information dominance. A multi-national coalition such as this will
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never operate as a single integrated force until they are all operating from the same
information paradigm.
A recent trip report from JEVIC personnel, after two weeks of site visits
throughout Bosnia and Europe, states:
The bottom line issue here is that the people who need to use the products
for the most part don't have access to them. Also, I'm not sure if
everyone who could use the JBS knows of its existence. [Ref. 22]
C. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
With the large bandwidth JBS 'pipe' information management should be one of
the highest priorities. Unfortunately, this is probably the least mature area of the JBS.
The EIMC developed the Information Management Annex to the BC2A CONOPS
(contained in Appendix B) as well as the interim procedures until the software and tools
necessary to implement the CONOPS are in place [Ref. 12]. However, a written
statement ofwhat will be available doesn't help the current users of the system.
Since the JBS became operational, information management has been an issue.
In November 1996 a report was released stating the findings of an oversight visit to four
BC2A sites in Bosnia. The report states, "Information management is not in place at
these sites" [Ref. 23]. It went on to state that the information management policy was
not yet implemented and "there are no information management tools ... to help the
user" [Ref. 23].
Users were receiving hundreds ofweather files, none ofwhich they were
using. The files they did use . . . had to be manually retrieved from the
system. This is exactly the situation the EIMC anticipated if sources were
allowed to push items to users that the users did not request ... By not
having the system perform according to the EIMC plan, we are turning off
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users and actually making use of the system more difficult than existing
systems .... [Ref. 23]
Although, many of these problems have, at least partially, been resolved by a
recent software upgrade that began being installed in late March 1 997, there are still
many information management hurdles to overcome. The challenge will be to develop
an automated method to implement the policies and procedures based on emerging
commercial information technologies to allow the user to go straight to the information
and get it without complex intermediate steps [Ref. 19]. This capability also needs to
support multiple levels of security and the coalition du jour environment that we are in.
This is required because "the military views information ... as a force multiplier and
requires that it be protected and selectively released to coalition partners under well
defined rules and control" [Ref. 24]. A report published by the National Defense
University states, "Managing all of the information available to the commander and his
staffwas a serious problem. Users did not have adequate tools to search for available
information" [Ref. 24].
The Washington Post summarized a DSB report with the following:
The 64-page report described a "broken communications pipe" between
Army brigades in the field and command headquarters. The break was
caused by a poor understanding ofwhat information is available, a lack of
communications "band width" to handle massive amounts of data,
equipment failure, and an inability to sort through and exploit the
intelligence that is available. [Ref. 2 1 ]
JBS is a way to provide the communications bandwidth to handle these 'massive
amounts of data.' In many cases JBS does provide useful support and a way to transmit
electronic information and data that has only been dreamed of in the past. However,
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there are several factors, to be explored in the next chapter, that have limited the
effectiveness of JBS in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and kept it almost completely out




Today's environment of shrinking budgets and military drawdowns forces the
DoD to continue to exploit the successes and breakthroughs in commercial technology in
order to reach the DoD's stated goal of Information Dominance. Just because we have
more knowledge or data than our enemy does not mean we have information dominance.
In fact, this is a very dangerous subtlety that many people miss. All of the data or
knowledge in the world is worthless if it cannot be used. It is the application of data or
knowledge that makes it useful and changes it into information.
The JBS is much like a big pipe. Ideally, it is a means to get a lot of data to a
place where it can be used, hopefully, in time for it to be useful. After this boat load of
data arrives at its destination, there must be a way to quickly sift through it to find that
which can be applied. Unfortunately, there are many obstacles that can get in the way.
These obstacles can cause the information to be lost or become too outdated to be useful.
Or it can become less effective because it is degraded by time or only some of it can be
found.
JBS has seen a few real successes as well as some real disappointments. The
effectiveness of JBS has been limited due to several factors that are discussed in this
chapter. We will then look at what kind of overall effect the JBS has had on the decision
making process of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and the operation itself.
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A. LIMITATIONS TO JBS EFFECTIVENESS
Planning for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began without much thought toward
the use of a direct broadcast satellite capability, because it was a technology that was not
yet fielded. Many things followed this initial, unavoidable oversight that limited the
effectiveness of the JBS and the amount of use it received. Nearly all of the limiting
factors discussed below have their genesis in the lack of an integrated planning effort due
primarily to the short timeframe from receiving the deployment order and JBS becoming
operational. Although this thesis deals specifically with JBS, many of these limiting
factors apply to other technology insertion programs that are rushed to the field as well.
1. Demonstration
The JBS was begun as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
program in an effort to use the 'only war in town' to test some of the capabilities of this
new technology and develop lessons learned for future application. In most cases an
ACTD is approached somewhat cautiously by fielding only a few systems for use.
Because of the visibility ofGBS and broadcast technology, this JBS capability was
thrown together and very quickly sent to the European Theater. Funding for this effort
was received on 22 January 1996. The first JBS receive suite was deployed less than two
months later and the JBS was declared operational less than 3 months later (6 April
1996). In less than ten months 33 JBS receive suites had been deployed. Commanders
often felt as if technology insertion programs were being 'shoved down their throats' and
felt left out of the coordination loop with regard to JBS deployments. In fact, after the
installation of JBS receive suites at ARRC and IFOR Headquarters in Bosnia, in August
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1996, there were complaints that nobody knew the systems were coming and therefore
nobody knew how to use or exploit the systems [Ref. 29].
2. Training
Because the required equipment was fielded and deployed very quickly there was
no time to accomplish any real training of personnel on how to use the system. This
caused a major lack of familiarity with the system and its capabilities as well as the
associated lack of training. The lack of familiarity with the JBS and its capabilities left
almost no advocates of the JBS system in the field to show commanders and other users
the benefits and potential of the system. The lack of training was a critical issue. A
BC2A mobile training team was established in the summer of 1996 to meet some of these
deficiencies, however the training course did not cover JBS [Ref. 30]. In some cases,
this led to the equipment being physically turned off because commanders did not want
to invest the time necessary to get personnel trained in a haphazard, on-the-job fashion.
This training problem was exacerbated by frequent personnel rotation. Most
people working at the JBS sites are TDY augmentees on a 60 or 90 day rotation. People
rotate in and out so often it is difficult to maintain the 'corporate knowledge' of the
system, how it works, the units the equipment services, what capabilities it provides, and
how it benefits the users. The equipment is not especially difficult to use but there are
many peripheral issues associated with the operational environment that greatly help or
hinder the effective use of the JBS, dependent upon the knowledge of the people that are
assigned.
Many of the new systems and technologies were deployed without
doctrinal support or concepts of operations. As a consequence, they could
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not be fully employed. Moreover,
. . . trained military operators were not
available. ... In many cases, this meant that new systems were
underutilized because their full functionality and potential were not
understood. [Ref. 24]
3. Logistics
Another area that created many problems, especially in the early days of the
operation, was the lack of a logistics trail. Since the JBS was fielded as a demonstration
system no real planning was given to providing maintenance and equipment spares (in
spite of the fact that it was going to 29 sites). A TDY JBS augmentee on a 60 day
rotation wrote in his trip report, "Logistical support for hardware and software is
extremely slow and unreliable. . . . Inadequate parts cause the system to be shut down
and unavailable until new parts arrive, sometimes several days later" [Ref. 31].
4. Other Views
As with any other subject, there are always people with views on JBS that differ
from your own. In the Multi-National Division (MND) environment in Bosnia this is
true not only of individuals but of nations and other organizations as well. As mentioned
in a previous chapter, some nations do not like to share information, but others do. The
various militaries generally prefer more control over information, the United Nations
along with other political and public organizations prefer fewer restrictions. All of these
differing viewpoints led to limits on how much the JBS was used and how far the
available information was disseminated.
The usage level varied from site to site with the British and French MNDs
at Banja Luka and Mostar not really using it . . .Other sites such as the
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps at Sarajevo . . . and the 1 st Armored Division
at Tuzla used it more .... [Ref. 1 2]
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. . .
with more than 30 different nations participating, there was a
significant challenge to merge the cultural differences to achieve unity of
effort and avoid "cultural clashes." [Ref. 24]
Additionally, because no specific units (e.g., intelligence or operations) have been
given responsibility for, or 'ownership' of, the equipment it is treated differently at
nearly every site. This lack of formal ownership lets nearly every group possible have
their own views as to how the system should be used and provides no specific guidance
to eliminate the disagreements.
5. Lack of Dissemination
Although "the deployed high technology systems generally supported the
headquarters far more effectively than they supported the soldier on the ground . . ."
[Ref. 24], it is generally the people below the headquarters level that can best use most of
the information available. Because of cost and maturity oftechnology there were only a
limited number of sites that could receive the JBS equipment. This rightly ended up
being those locations that had the personnel, best power sources, and best connectivity to
other systems. Thus, almost by default, they were placed at headquarters locations.
Commanders and their staffs do make use of the information available, but generally it is
not available to the lower echelon soldier.
. . .
life in Bosnia has not changed very much for the American soldier,
because the information revolution largely stops at Division level.
Despite the techno-hype, subordinate brigades and battalions typically
conduct operations much as they did 20 years ago .... [Ref. 27]
Units below the Division or headquarters level often do not have access to the
local area networks (assuming the JBS is integrated into the local systems), computers, or
printers to allow them to effectively use the information if they could get it. There are
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also no documents or guidance that I have been able to find that discusses the distribution
of JBS products. In most cases, if users don't work at the JBS equipment site they either
don't know the system is available or they experience long delays getting the information
they need, thus decreasing the value of the information.
6. No Integration
There are three specific locations (USS LaSalle, CAOC, and Tuzla) where they
have integrated JBS into their LAN and have been able to (with various degrees of
success) get broadcast products directly to the user's desktop. These three sites would be
great examples ofhow to integrate the JBS because, unfortunately, they are the exception
and not the rule.
Although the GBS program requirement is to be fully integrated into the DA, one
of the biggest obstacles to effective use of the JBS is that its receive equipment suites are
usually physically separated from and/or not integrated into locally existing networks.
Two primary reasons for the lack of integration at receive sites is the lack of floor space
and the fact that "Because the system has no formal testing, and was essentially thrust
upon many of the users, it is not trusted" [Ref. 31].
The lack of floor space is often due to the deployed field conditions. All of the
JBS equipment (although not a large amount) had to occupy whatever space was
available since it arrived after UN forces were already in place. Additionally, some sites
had to put their equipment in tents or other luxurious military shelters.
The lack of formal testing is an issue that will continue to concern users. This
should be somewhat alleviated when the system passes accreditation testing, but probably
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won't be eliminated until the software baseline stabilizes, the information management
tools are in place, and personnel are fully trained on the system.
This lack of integration does not only apply at the receive sites, but at the transmit
sites as well. Because of lack of floor space and physical separation of the equipment,
transmitting information over JBS (from JAC Molesworth) has, until recently, required
dumping the files to a tape, physically taking the tape to a different building,
downloading the files to the BC2A equipment, and then sending the information to the
JIMC for uplink to the satellite for broadcast [Ref. 12].
Due of the short deployment timeline for JBS and because it is a operationally
deployed developmental system (supporting the GBS demonstration phase), the JBS is
and probably will remain a stovepipe system in spite of the many advances and
improvements made over the last 16 months.
The integration problem is not just a hardware/location problem. It involves
overcoming attitudes as well. This is well illustrated by the following:
One of our significant challenges is to integrate BC2A to best support the
MNDs. ... Ifwe are serious about integrating BC2A into these MNDs,
the cost is an augmentee that has the rank of major or higher. This rank is
required for access to the decision makers to fix the current site
configuration. It takes time and effort to persuade the MNDs to position
their components in the optimal locations. The MNDs will utilize the
system to its potential only when the components are in the right place.
Until we succeed in this endeavor, we will have difficulties maximizing
the capability of the system. [Ref. 25]
Because of the problems with support, training, and integration, the cartoon
shown in Figure 12 began being passed around to depict, although somewhat cynically,
the level of frustration with the initial JBS capabilities.
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Figure 12. JBS in its Initial Integrated State
7. Security Concerns
In a UN operation involving over 30 nations it is easy to imagine the rampant
worry about classified information and who has access to the information. Modifications
were made to the JBS after the initial installations to allow it to pass all classification
levels up to and including SECRET. Security managers were very wary of this since the
JBS had undergone no formal testing. And, in spite of all the efforts to protect classified
information on the JBS, there were many instances of security 'incidents.'
Data sent from the BMC is incorrectly identified and classified. Often,
map and HTML files were wrapped and sent as SECRET or
CONFIDENTIAL but were not. Imagery that was SECRET REL NATO
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was sent as UNCLASSIFIED and was not identified as classified until the
annotation on the actual imagery was read. [Ref. 3 1 ]
8. Reliability
For the JBS system to be used effectively it must be viewed as a reliable method
of receiving and exploiting information. When dealing with equipment, reliability is
most often associated with a physical capability. It is also a trust that is developed
between the user and the system. The following quotation graphically depicts the
reasons for some of the frustrations associated with the JBS system as late as October
1 996. These types of problems hit at the very heart of system reliability and must be
solved for the system to be trusted and used.
... I was surprised at the number ofways a product could get "detoured"
once it entered the JAC. Put in a wrong piece of header data . . . and the
user will not be able to pull up what he needs . . . because the query will
not recognize it . . . Once the information is in the server ... it isn't
readily apparent which piece of information is most time-sensitive and
critical. ... it has to pass through a singular point of failure, the router at
Ft. Belvoir. Surviving this, it has to pass through the JIMC queue . . . The
"queue" failed on several occasions to broadcast the entire tape and in
several instances appeared to have not operated properly with respect to
precedences. . . . Once it has been broadcast, the JBS receive stations . .
.
must have available [disk] space ... or all the information will be dumped
. . . and . . . there is a good possibility ... the crypto will have dropped
synch. [Ref. 32]
In June 1996 members from the Defense Science Board visited the JBS site in
Sarajevo. While there they conducted a small experiment.
The DSB submitted a request for a specific product over various
architectures. JDISS provided the product in 5 minutes, LOCE in 30
minutes, and by the time I had left it had been over 48 hours and the
product had not yet arrived nor had there been any specific feedback
regarding the request that had been submitted to the JIMC . . . [Ref. 33]
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Several months later during an informal test conducted in October 1996 a set of
52 2-4 Mb files were sent over one of the daily broadcasts. Only 26 of those files were
received by the broadcast. These 26 files trickled in over a one hour time period. This is
not necessarily indicative of the JBS' normal performance but definitely points out a
problem that must be solved. [Ref. 32]
9. Information Management
This topic was covered fairly well in the previous chapter and will not be
reproduced here except to reiterate that information management tools are a necessity to
prevent information overload and to make sense of the boat load of data received.
B. EFFECTS ON THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Since there are decision making processes from very high up to very low levels in
the command chain, this section will briefly discuss the impact at very high levels in the
decision making process. The impact at mid and lower levels will be mentioned in the
next section discussing the effect ofJBS on operations.
In most cases, decision making at the very high levels in Bosnia and the European
Theater was relatively unaffected by the presence of JBS and its big information pipe. It
was viewed as an unreliable demonstration system that was in theater more for the "gee-
whiz" factor than anything else [Ref. 26]. Commanders and other decision makers at this
level did not care how they got the imagery or information they needed as long as they
got it when they needed it. JBS was just another pipe, not something to get real excited
about.
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There were two incidents, however, in which the video dissemination capability
of the JBS was very useful and may have impacted some high level decisions. The first
is known as the Hans Pisjak incident. On 5 July 1996 armored vehicles began rolling out
of cantonment areas. Real-time video links (over JBS) from a Predator UAV were used
by commanders to closely monitor the situation. This greatly enhanced the distributed
collaborative planning that was taking place in response to this situation. A similar
incident occurred at Mostar on 1 1 February 1997.
C. EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS
As should be expected of a demonstration system and one that is on the leading
edge oftechnology, the JBS has not had an earthshaking effect on operations, but it has
had a positive effect. The effect of the JBS on decision making and operations at the low
levels of the command chain has been minimal because, as previously stated, units below
the Division level usually do not have direct access to JBS receive suites. However, the
middle levels (MND headquarters level) in the command chain have seen a larger impact
than anywhere else, although this is still very site-specific because of the issues presented
above as well as the missions of the units at those sites.
The largest positive impact of the JBS is primarily due to the faster delivery of
imagery used for operational planning purposes. Photography, and other imagery, often
has to be compressed to allow delivery by electronic means. Now, with JBS, it can be
delivered faster at much lower levels of compression which helps maintain better
resolution and quality. Maps and other very large files, which in the past had to be
delivered by mail or courier and could take up to several days, can now be delivered in a
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matter of minutes. As mentioned above, the real-time distribution of video can also be
very important to an operation.
Although the impact of the JBS on JOINT ENDEAVOR operations may seem
minimal at this point, we must remember that the JBS is just getting started. JBS is
getting easier to use and is achieving user acceptance. The demand for broadcast
services continues to grow as well. The JBS will be a very useful and capable system
but, unfortunately, it will be fighting an uphill battle for quite some time just to
overcome many of the first impressions that were left over from its initial months in
operation. When these initial impressions are overcome and the system matures and
stabilizes the JBS will be a force multiplier by helping to provide information dominance
on the battlefield.
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VI. THEATER INJECTION CAPABILITY
The DoD's overall goal for the GBS is a single comprehensive system that
provides worldwide high bandwidth coverage. To help accomplish this goal the military
plans to use two types of uplink facilities: the Primary Injection Point (PIP) and the
Theater Injection Point (TIP). The PIP is a fixed facility that uplinks source information
into the broadcast system for receipt by users within the footprint of a particular satellite.
The TIP is a transportable system located ashore or afloat that "includes transmit
broadcast management and transmit uplink capabilities necessary to accept, coordinate,
package, and to transmit vital CINC/CJTF/component directed in-theater information"
[Ref. 28]. This chapter will discuss the specified requirements for the theater injection
points, the difference between virtual theater injection and theater injection, and what has
been done with regard to TIP development.
A. INJECTION REQUIREMENTS
The development of a theater injection capability is driven by a one sentence
requirement in the Joint Mission Need Statement which states, "GBS should provide the
capability for CINC and CJTF theater injection of information onto the broadcast" [Ref.
3]. The JORD goes into some specific detail on requirements for the TIP, including the
following minimum requirements [Ref. 28]:
• Be capable of uplinking 6 Mbps with a 93 percent assurance of continuous
connectivity
51
• Be capable of uplinking to the UFO GBS satellite (Ku band)
• Be capable of operating in 45 mph sustained winds and 60 mph gusts with
blowing sand, dust, or snow.
These minimum requirements will be used to assess on a pass/fail basis whether
or not the TIP will support the operational needs of the warfighter. The first two
requirements above have additional 'objective' requirements, or goals, beyond the
minimum required. These TIP objectives include uplinking 24 Mbps with a 98 percent
assurance of continuous connectivity and being capable of uplinking to a leased
commercial satellite (Ka band) for GBS augmentation [Ref. 28]. Several other
requirements are specified in the JORD but they deal primarily with the actual physical
design of the TIP and won't be discussed here. Once these requirements are met and an
operational TIP is fielded and in place, it will provide the commander with the ability to
directly inject information from theater sources onto the broadcast.
One point of debate is whether or not the TIP requires an actual uplink capability
or just a method to get information on the broadcast. The second requirement stated
above seems to imply a required uplink capability, as does the one sentence requirement
in the MNS. But, the JORD tends to negate that implication by stating that the ability to
"broadcast real-time and near real-time in-theater source information . . . may be
accomplished by either the TIP or by virtual injection" [Ref. 28]. This seeming conflict
in requirements has sparked serious discussions but will probably only be settled after a
detailed cost analysis is completed, the Joint In-Theater Injection (Jill) terminal (the TTP
prototype) is fully tested, and it is determined which side has the most political backing.
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To actually inject information on the broadcast requires communications
connectivity from each information provider (source) to the appropriate injection point.
Although the JBS has the Theater Injection Site (TIS) located at RAF Molesworth, UK,
it has only one uplink site, the PEP (co-located at the Pentagon with the BMC). This
requires that all information to be broadcast must be sent to the one uplink site by
satellite, telephone, teletype, internet, or whatever means is available. In the case of
JOINT ENDEAVOR operations, information derived from theater sources is sent to the
TIS. From there the information is sent to the PIP via the DISN-LES where it is
subsequently added to the queue for a future broadcast. Thus, the current theater
injection site has what is called a 'virtual injection capability' as it cannot provide a
direct uplink to the satellite. For purposes of this chapter I will use TIP to refer to a true
theater injection (uplink capable) point and TVIS to refer to a Theater Virtual Injection
Site (not uplink capable).
B. VIRTUAL INJECTION VERSUS UPLINK
As stated above, source information providers must transmit their information to
either the TIP or the PIP for subsequent broadcast. In many cases (e.g., the European
Theater and Bosnia) the source providers may be thousands of miles away from the PIP
and may even be located in the Area of Operation (AO), such as Predator and combat
camera units (see Figure 6).
1. Virtual Injection
For the European Theater, 'virtual injection' requires sending the source
information to the TVIS and then from the TVIS over communications links thousands
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of miles back to the PIP only to be rebroadcast back into the European AO. This is a
very inefficient use of the communications links. Whether or not it is more cost effective
or desirable than putting an uplink capability in theater is another subject that will not be
discussed here.
There are two distinct advantages to having a virtual injection capability instead
of a true injection capability. First, and most obviously, there is the possibility of a
substantial cost savings to the DoD by not putting time and money into the design,
development, production, and fielding of the TTPs. Secondly, there would be no logistics
requirements to transport, maintain, repair, and protect the TIP while it is in theater.
Figure 13 portrays the numbers of communications links, and the distances those
links must cover, to support a theater virtual injection capability. In this example with
two satellites, each satellite would have a separate PIP. To send the same information to
both satellites for broadcast would require twice as many communications links since the
information would have to be sent over separate links from the source to each TVIS and
from there to each PIP, or to each PIP directly.
2. Theater Uplink
A theater uplink only requires sending the source information to the TIP. From
there it will be directly uplinked to the satellite to be broadcast back into the theater.
This is a much more efficient use of the communications links. Once again, whether or
not it is more cost effective or desirable than using a TVIS is another subject that will not
be discussed here.
A true injection capability has several distinct advantages. First is the cost
savings to the DoD by not having to lease commercial long distance circuits (to include
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trans-oceanic and satellite links). This can be a substantial savings when you consider
that the cost to lease a single Intelsat 3 transponder (for VSAT) is an "annual -[six
million dollars]" [Ref. 23]. Second is the ability to inject information directly without
the increased possibility of errors due to the transmission through the many necessary
lines,
Figure 13. Virtual Injection Concept
repeaters, switches, and facilities. Third is that the theater uplink capability would still
exist if the PIP is shut down (a limited backup capability). Conversely, if the TIP was
shut down the broadcast from the PIP would still be available, as well as the possibility
of getting critical theater information to the PEP for subsequent broadcast. Lastly, in
many areas of the world good wideband communications to the TIP would be easier to
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get, from theater (organic) assets, than the necessary wideband communications from the
TVIS to the PIP.
Figure 14 portrays the numbers of communications links, and the distances those
links must cover, to support a theater injection (uplink) capability. In this example with
two satellites, each satellite would have a separate PIP. However, each satellite would
also be able to accept an uplink from up to three TIPs, which can be shared between the
satellites as long as the TIP is in the view of the satellite [Ref. 28]. To send the same
information to both satellites for broadcast would require communications links between
the TIPs, sharing uplink time between satellites (depending upon the criticality of the
information), or communications links from the information sources to each TIP. Figure
14 depicts the second option with each satellite being supported by multiple TIPs. This




Figure 14. Theater Injection Concept
C. TIP DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
As defined earlier in this chapter, the TIP is a transportable system with the
capabilities necessary to handle broadcast management and to accept, coordinate,
package, and uplink information from within the theater to the JBS satellite for broadcast
back into the theater. The JOT terminal is the only system designed as a testbed to
provide proof of concept demonstrations and technology experiments" [Ref. 34].
The Jill design and construction effort was led by the U.S. Army Space
Command and supported by the Army's Communications-Electronics Command
(CECOM), the Army's Battle Command Battle Lab - Fort Gordon, and the Air Force
Communications Agency (AFCA). It was based on the requirement in the GBS MNS
and the hypothesis that "If a theater commander is allocated satellite communications
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throughput and an organic ability to inject information directly into a satellite for
broadcast to his deployed forces, then the lethality of his forces is improved" [Ref. 35].
It has been used extensively during the GBS Phase I CONUS Testbed operations and was
demonstrated during the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWBD) 1996.
1. JITI Configuration
The Jill is housed on a 21 foot trailer that contains a seven foot by seven foot
shelter for equipment and personnel. The trailer also accommodates a 3.7 meter tracking
antenna, generator, and an environmental control unit as shown in Figure 15. Separate
from the trailer, but required for operation, is an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS).
This configuration has been C-130 certified and meets the requirement for
transportability on one C-l 30 aircraft. A forklift is required to move the UPS and a 5 ton
mover is required for the trailer.
3.7 Meter
Tracking Antenna
7' x 7' Equipment
Shelter
21 Foot Trailer with Generator and ECU
Figure 15. JITI Terminal Configuration on a 21 Foot Trailer [Ref. 35 & Ref. 36]
The Jill was designed using COTS equipment and technology as much as
possible. It utilizes the on-board generator or commercial power and operates in the Ku
frequency band. The tracking antenna helps during initial acquisition of the satellite and,
if necessary, during satellite changes by tracking off of the beacon signal emitted by the
satellite. The Signal Entry Panel provides the interface to outside sources and can handle
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fiber optic cable, two telephone jacks, two video channels (six inputs), and two additional
equipment connectors (for future UAV connections). Bulk encryption for broadcast is
done by a KG- 194A.
2. JWID96
"The primary demonstration goal for the Jill terminal during JWTD 96 was to
show the ability to simultaneously inject information products from both Theater
information sources through the terminal and Regional information sources through the
PIP" [Ref. 34]. The JWID 96 configuration is shown in Figure 16. Most of the
information products for broadcast were provided by a LAN connection to the Army
Digitized Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and telephone connectivity was maintained
between the Jill and the PIP so users could work from a consolidated program (channel)
guide [Ref. 34]. The primary JWID goal was met with the JITI broadcasting video and
encrypted data while the PIP was simultaneously injecting other information products.
After the JWID 96 demonstration the JITI was moved to CECOM at Fort
Monmouth, NJ, to take over operations as the GBS CONUS Testbed uplink facility while
the GBS testbed at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was moved to the Pentagon. It
operated as the testbed from September 1996 to March 1997, after which it was upgraded
and an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) capability added. The upgrade gives the
Jill the capability to uplink 1 classified and 1 unclassified data channel, 4 video
channels, and 1 ATM channel. This new capability was used to support testing for the
Battlefield Analysis and Data Dissemination (BADD) program as well as other












Figure 16. JWID 96 GBS Configuration [Ref. 34]
Development of a second prototype will be left to the contractor that wins the
contract for GBS Phase 2 which has not yet been announced. The design plans and
lessons learned from the JITI will be provided after contract award to ensure a sound
design with as little rework as possible. Because of the delays on getting the GBS Phase
2 contract awarded, the JITI may still support Phase 2 of the GBS program and could
provide a TIP initial operational capability (IOC) to meet the Phase 2 requirements with
the UFO/G satellites that will be launched beginning in early 1998. The JITI may also
act as an Interim Injection Point and serve as a temporary operational uplink to the




VII. LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
History should have taught us that there is never enough available
communications. The story of the soldier in Grenada making a personal credit card call
back to headquarters on a public telephone will be etched in military history books
forever as a grand example ofhow interservice parochialism and stovepipe C4I systems
lead to a lack of communications interoperability that adversely affects a battlefield.
Desert Storm taught us another hard lesson about how inadequate our communications
capabilities are when compared to what we think we need. We have learned. We have
improved our interoperability and our capabilities, but we can never get enough
bandwidth.
The purpose of this thesis was threefold. The first purpose was to provide a brief
history of the commercial DBS technology and outline the basics of the Global Broadcast
Service as a basis for discussion. The second purpose was to provide an in-depth look at
the JBS in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, how it was used, how effective it was at
providing a new capability for the warrior, and develop some lessons learned based on
this research. The final purpose was to look at the theater injection capability from a
high level and determine if it is a necessary capability. This chapter conveys some ofmy
thoughts regarding the JBS and lessons learned from its use in Bosnia as well as my
conclusions based on this research. Lastly, I identify a couple of areas that require
further research.
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As far as its performance as an operational tool, I think the JBS was incorrectly
advertised as a panacea to solving the communications problems and many people and
organizations expected perfection and immediate impact. Instead it has performed very
well for the rapid reaction technology demonstration program it is. It has provided a
capability for the warfighter to access information and products previously unavailable
electronically or, in many cases, faster than otherwise available. Additionally, its
operational use has provided many lessons learned that will be invaluable to the GBS
program.
A. LESSONS LEARNED
I have grouped many of these lessons learned from its operational use into four
broad categories and summarized them below.
1. Information Management
As technology improves and information can be passed at faster and faster rates
we must realize that the detail, resolution, and amount of information available will also
increase. Thus, regardless of the amount of information available to us, or the amount of
data we can send each second, the key to the effective use of this information is
information management. First, we must decide what types of information are critical
and what are not (e.g., based on subject matter, time, or location) and establish levels of
precedence that are standard throughout the DoD. Second, we must place restrictions on
how much information is sent to our deployed forces that was not specifically requested
by those forces. Lastly, we need to provide the hardware and software tools necessary to
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filter, sort, retrieve, and manipulate the information received quickly, in a user friendly
manner, and at the location where it is needed.
2. Integration
After information management, the next biggest hurdle to effective use of
information is integration. Both the transmit and receive sites must be integrated into the
local networks. Not only will this make providing information management tools easier
but it will make the system and its products available to the users where and when they
need it. If information is not easily accessible or reliable it will not be used.
Additionally, the overall goal of the DoD's C4I for the Warrior concept is a
single integrated 'infosphere.' Until the JBS/GBS is completely and effectively
integrated into this infosphere (in this case specifically the DISN and DII) it will remain
a stovepipe system and its effectiveness will be limited regardless of the products that it
provides.
3. Training
Based on my research, many of the problems with the JBS (e.g., reliability,
logistics, and security) could have been mitigated or avoided by providing an up-front
comprehensive training program.
To effectively use the system there must be people trained and familiar with its
capabilities. This should include, if at all possible, training from someone that has done
the job, not just the systems engineers that developed the system. This training must be
provided before the person arrives in the position where he/she is expected to operate the
system.
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A master user, or help desk, where users can go to get additional help quickly and
whenever needed is also important. Many problems in Europe remained problems much
longer than necessary because there was no support available after duty hours in
Washington D.C. or on a weekend. If the system is operational 24 hours a day then the
help desk must be adequately staffed 24 hours a day.
4. Planning
Proper planning for a rapid deployment, as is common among technology
insertion and rapid prototype programs, is difficult at best. However, for any system
deployment there needs to be a well thought out and coordinated plan. The plan needs to
include information regarding where the equipment should be placed, how to integrate it
into the local network, equipment spares and maintenance, and an overall training plan
for the unit. The plan then needs to be implemented making sure each aspect is
effectively accomplished. Sometimes it is better to incur fielding delays than to deploy
the system before it is ready. The lack of a proper planning effort will negatively impact
the user's perceptions of the system by not providing them the information needed to
integrate it into their operational architecture.
5. Be Realistic
If it is a great program that is mature and expected to change the world then
advertise it that way and go out and do it. But, be prepared for all of those things
mentioned above.
If the program is in the developmental stages, on the leading edge of technology,
and unfielded or in the rapid prototyping stage don't advertise it as a system that will
change the world, and don't expect it to. Start out small. Test it at a few sites to get it
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working as desired before going ahead with a general deployment. And, be prepared for
all of those things mentioned above (and more).
Many of the problems encountered by the JBS were due to the fact that it was a
new system that was sent to too many sites, too fast, without enough planning and
preparation.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The JBS is a relatively new system that was fielded rapidly to support Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR. It has provided many lessons learned that will benefit the BC2A
and GBS programs as well as many others. Most of the issues identified in this thesis are
being addressed as the JBS continues to improve and gain more user acceptance.
I began this research looking at the JBS as a new operational tool for the
warfighter that would be a major player in providing Information Dominance. However,
as I got deeper into my research I realized that the JBS is not a well developed system
that was designed from the ground up for the military. It is a rapid prototype technology
demonstration program and its primary role is to prove concepts and gain valuable
experience to be applied toward the GBS program. Its secondary role is to provide a
new tool for the forward deployed troops to use in their operations. Based on the results
ofmy research, as summarized in this thesis, I determined that the JBS has performed its
primary role superbly and its secondary role adequately. As the JBS continues to be used
and improved the users will begin to recognize the capabilities it brings to the fight. The
bottom line is that the JBS is not a panacea and does not solve all of our communications
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problems, but it is a definite success and will become one of our communications
workhorses of the future.
Additionally, the use of a true theater injection point (uplink capable) will greatly
enhance the effectiveness of the JBS/GBS by providing a theater uplink capability that
can furnish the flexibility required in a military operation without clogging up the
deployed forces long-haul communications.
These two capabilities together will prove to be a true force multiplier.
C. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This thesis presented the 'history' of the deployment and use of the JBS in
Bosnia. With all of the lessons learned from this continuing experience in Bosnia the
next logical step would be to take those lessons learned and develop a plan to implement
the necessary changes in the JBS (BC2A) and GBS programs.
Because direct satellite broadcasting in a military environment is pushing the
edge of the technology envelope, there are many other areas that could use additional
study with regard to the JBS and GBS. There are two specific areas that I feel are
important enough to mention here. These two areas are:
• Technology Insertion Programs. What can be done to more
effectively handle technology insertion programs? How can they be better
planned for? How can they be inserted without operational commanders feeling
overwhelmed with 'good ideas?' Should there be a central clearinghouse for
these programs? Should there be some minimum requirements that must be met
before they should be deployed? What can be done to provide a smoother
transition and better integration of these systems?
• Information Management Is there a way to specify critical types of
information? What types of information are most useful operationally (e.g., for
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air, land, and sea operations)? Can a DoD-wide precedence system be




APPENDIX A. JIMC/JBS DETAILED REPORTS [REF. 39, 40, & 41]
JIMC UP TIME STATUS REPORT



















83.51% 1. 1700Z 12May - 1552Z 13May: Hardware failure onNATO
IFL. 22hr. 52min.
2. 1 303Z - 1 333Z 14May : Configuration error with NATO IFL.
30min.









US Secret Gateway 100%
Rel NATO Gateway 100%
BINO US Secret 99.06% 1. 0940Z-1 1 15Z 17 May: Software configuration error, lhr.
35min.
BINO Rel NATO 100%
TRAP 100%
RDM US Secret 99.11% 1 . 1 620Z-1 750Z 1 5 May IP SECRET file system error caused
system crash, lhr. 30min.
RDM Rel NATO 100%
ATM






JBS US SECRET IP CHANNEL STATISTICS
WEEKENDING 18 MAY 1997
Product Number Product Delivery Number
Classification of Files Date of Files
UNCLASSIFIED 4551 12-May-97 1012
SECRET 754 13-May-97 868
RELNATO 2 14-May-97 875
NATO/SFOR 3 15-May-97 877






Product Priority of Files Product Destinations of Files
1 ("Flash") 1 ALL 3924
2 ("Immediate") 247 BOSNIA 4305
3 ("Priority") 83 STUTTGART 447







Product Number VICENZA 114
Type of Files CAMP MCGOVERN 108
ATO USS LASALLE 96




MESSAGES File Size (Bytes) of Files
TACTICAL AOB <1 155
INTEL PRODUCTS 2 >1 and <32 2
TOMAHAWK MDU 2 >32 and <128 4
MPEG 2 >128 and <256 44
MAPS 2 >256 and <512 47
CGS 2 >512 and <1024 226
ESD 2 >1024 and <2048 215
GCCS COP 3 >2048 and <4096 476
HTML 5 >4096 and <8192 264
IMAGERY 5 >8192 and <16384 83
EARLY BIRD 5 >16384 and <32768 203
STARS & STRIPES 8 >32768 and <65536 1707
TEXT 48 >65536 and <131072 730
NITF 74 >131072 and <262144 301
GRAPHICS 87 >262144 and <524288 781
UNKNOWN 161 >524288 and < 1048576 277
IPA 194 >1048576 and <2097152 222
SYSTEM 314 >2097152 and <4194304 69
BC2A PRODUCTS 1016 >4194304 and <^8388608 11
WEATHER 3921 >8388608 and <33554432 1
Total Number of Files 5860 >33554432 and < 134217728 4




DATE AFRTS CNN PREDATOR
1-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 97.00%
8-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 82.00%
16-Fcb 98.11% 100.00% 100.00%
22-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
2-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
9-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 91.50%
16-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 98.95%
23-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 97.98%
30-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 88.20%
6-Apr 100.00% 100.00% 93.70%
13-Apr 100.00% 100.00% 99.40%
20-Apr 100.00% 100.00% 99.80%
27-Apr 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
4-May 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
11-May 99.50% 99.50% 99.50%
18-May 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
DATE NATOBINO USBINO SEC AUDIO
1-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
8-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 82.00%
16-Feb 97.76% 88.99% 100.00%
22-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
2-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
9-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
16-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
23-Mar 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
30-Mar 100.00% 82.50% 100.00%
6-Apr 100.00% 98.40% 100.00%
13-Apr 100.00% 86.20% 100.00%
20-Apr 100.00% 94.64% 100.00%
27-Apr 100.00% 99.70% 100.00%
4-May 99.91% 87.35% 100.00%
11-May 99.50% 99.50% 99.50%
18-May 100.00% 99.06% 100.00%




1-Feb 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
8-Feb 82.00% 100.00% 82.00% 82.00%
16-Fcb 85.22% 85.22% 88.99% 100.00%
22-Feb 98.84% 98.84% 98.84% 100.00%
2-Mar 98.80% 83.53% 99.55% 100.00%
9-Mar 98.80% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
16-Mar 81.16% 98.16% 99.30% 100.00%
23-Mar 95.78% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
30-Mar 99.10% 100.00% 82.50% 88.20%
6-Apr 100.00% 99.70% 99.30% 100.00%
13-Apr 100.00% 100.00% 99.40% 99.40%
20-Apr 100.00% 70.72% 100.00% 100.00%
27-Apr 100.00% 99.02% 100.00% 100.00%
4-May 84.97% 96.13% 98.09% 100.00%
11-May 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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JBS Availability
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DAY Operational Total Messages
Hours Up Hours Up Received
1 8 N/A N/A
2 8 N/A N/A
3 8 N/A N/A
4 8 N/A N/A
7 8 16.1 86
8 0.1 0.1 16
9 6.5 6.5 251
10 8 9.25
11 8 11 20
15 8 14.1 159
16 8 11.6 256
17 8 15.6 224
18 8 11.1 209
21 8 8.75 235
22 8 17.6 938
23 8 24 898
24 8 16.4 N/A
25 8 24 N/A
28 8 N/A N/A
29 8 N/A N/A
30 8 N/A N/A
31 8 N/A N/A
TOTALS 166.6 191.1 3292
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Information Management Annex to BC2A Concept of Operations
D.l. Overview
D.l. 1 Purpose
The purpose of this annex to the BC2A CONOPS is to establish BC2A policies and
procedures for information management (IM) to support USEUCOM theater
commanders. The intent of the IM policies and procedures contained herein is to
facilitate the flow of accurate and timely information to warfighters. While the focus of
effort will be on supporting operational commanders, the BC2A is also capable of
supporting logistics, intelligence, personnel, medical and other information requirements.
BC2A can also reach other geographic areas as a means of sharing operational
information with supporting commands and higher headquarters. This large capacity
broadcast capability serves to provide video and large data files very quickly to one, a
few, or all users in the satellite broadcast footprint.
Although some of the discussion in this annex may be related to system security, Annex
G of the BC2A CONOPS provides BC2A system security policy and guidance.
D.l. 2 System Elements
Under the BC2A program, EUCOM will receive several new capabilities, including:
satellite broadcast, via Joint Broadcast Service (JBS), of both streaming (video/audio) and
packetized data, very small aperture terminal (VSAT) satellite networking, and large
information servers with server-to-server interaction and associated advanced applications.
These new capabilities will complement and eventually be fully integrated with existing
networks and applications, such as SIPRNET, GCCS and Intelink-S. The information
servers will be deployed to user sites and will be connected to a JBS terminal and,
depending on configuration, other communications systems such as the BC2A VSAT
network or SIPRNET. Sites with JBS broadcast receivers will be able to receive video and
data. Video will be routed by the JBS to the video receivers and data to the information
server. These sites will also be able to request special broadcasts to meet site information
needs.
This annex focuses on JBS, primarily digital data broadcasts and to a lesser extent analog
video. Concepts for VSAT use will be developed as the system matures.
D.l. 2.1 Terms of Reference
Development of this concept resulted in the application of several terms of reference.
These terms of reference are key to understanding the IM concept of operations.
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D.l. 2.1.1 Catalog - The catalog is a list of information products that are available to
BC2A users. Product sources, such as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense
Mapping Agency (DMA), higher headquarters, and/or users themselves, populate the
catalog with meta data that describes products that can be accessed by BC2A users. The
catalog, which is maintained by the Joint Information Management Center (JIMC), will be
periodically broadcast to users over the JBS to be captured on their local server. Users can
browse or search the catalog for specific products using search engines. Based upon
review of the selected meta data, users can order the associated information product
through SIPRNET, phone, or fax modes.
D.l.2. 1.2 User Subscription - Users may receive all updates of recurring or periodic
information products by subscribing to that product when placing a catalog order with the
JIMC. Depending on the nature of the product, the updates could come very frequently or
infrequently. In either case, if a user subscribes to a product, he or she receives all the
updates until the subscription is canceled.
D.l.2. 1.3 EIMC Sponsor - The EIMC may, in effect, become a user by sponsoring the
broadcast of an information product upon request by the product source.
D.l.2. 1.4 Activity Report - Report produced and broadcast by the JIMC, which is a
summary of all broadcast activity during a specified period. The activity report can be
used to compare products that were broadcast with products that were received in a
user's JBS server.
D.l.2. 1.5 Video Broadcast Guide - A schedule of what will be broadcast over JBS video
channels. Analogous to the TV Guide.
D.1.3 Overall Philosophy
Policies and procedures in this annex will facilitate rapid transfer of information between
the warfighter and information sources using the JBS broadcast in conjunction with
existing networks. Policies and procedures outlined in this annex are embryonic and
based upon unproved and untested concepts. The guiding principle is direct access by the
user to needed information and very fast delivery of this information over a large capacity
broadcast system. This principle reflects the asymmetrical nature of information requests:
short requests for information answered by large files to fill the information need.
Broadcast technology is well suited to meet this need and relieve congestion from existing
two-way communications networks.
The warfighter will have access to more, potentially conflicting information, from a
variety of sources. The challenge will be to develop policies and procedures based on
emerging commercial information technologies that will provide a common picture of the
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battlefield without limiting access to such information. Command staffs and users must
continually review and update these policies and procedures to reflect innovative ideas and
lessons learned on how this information flow can be more flexible and responsive to meet
the needs of the warfighter.
To meet this challenge, the EIMC will establish policies to process information
requirements (such as an Information Annex to OPLANs), produce/package information
products, and distribute information to the user. These policies do not replace established
methods or circumvent command relationships. They set the stage for improving the
efficiency of information flow to the warfighter.
The policy outlined in this annex is intended to support procedures that can eventually be
automated. Again, the principle is for the user to go straight to the information and get it
without complex intermediate steps. Although software is being developed and tested to
meet this goal, it is not yet available. Interim procedures will be promulgated to facilitate
system use until automation is fully developed to support the concept outlined in this
annex.
D. 1.3.1 Exploitation/Integration of New Technology
BC2A incorporates new commercial technology that can be exploited for military
purposes. Among the potential uses are automated access and wide dissemination of near
real time video and large data files. To fully exploit the technology advances in the
BC2A, users must continue to develop and refine processes to take advantage of this
technology. As the system develops, it's components must be integrated into the Defense
Information Infrastructure (DII; e.g., GCCS, existing LANs, DISN, etc.) to expand
benefits to a wider user community.
D. 1.3.2 IM Responsiveness and Flexibility
Information management policy must be responsive to users needs. As new technology
accelerates delivery and caching of information, IM procedures should provide value and
not introduce unnecessary delays. The EIMC will work with all IM components to
incorporate user feedback to improve system responsiveness and utility. To facilitate the
responsiveness of BC2A, the EIMC will pursue the establishment of an Information
Management Annex in each EUCOM Operation Plan (OPLAN) to identify required
information to be broadcast to the theater upon execution of the OPLAN.
D.2. IM Components




• Site System Administrator (SSA) as appointed by users
• EUCOM Information Management Center (EIMC)
• Joint Information Management Center (JIMC)
• JBS Broadcast Management Center (BMC)
• Theater Injection Site (TIS)
• Information Sources/Production Sites
The EIMC, JIMC and BMC form the bridge between the operational users and the
information sources. The primary components' roles are defined below.
D.2.1 Users
• look for required information on local systems, prior to requesting information from
the JIMC. When the information is not held locally, users can search for required
information from the catalog or any appropriate external source, using whatever
means and/or network desired: SIPRNET, BC2A, Internet, or other network.
• Users are encouraged to request the JIMC add information that is found from other
sources to the catalog.
To get desired information from the JBS catalog, users first browse or search, using
search tools provided with the catalog. The catalog and search tools will be broadcast
periodically to all users so that they can search from their local server rather than
across a network as INTELINK-S or Internet Web currently operates. The catalog
entries will include meta data, which is information about the product being offered in
the catalog. Users can review this meta data to find out if the product is suitable to
meet their needs. If so, the users can click on the product icon and an order form will
appear on the screen. To order the product users complete the order form and connect
to the JIMC via SIPRNET. For users without SIPRNET access, the order form can be
printed and faxed to the JIMC or the order can be given verbally over the telephone.
Upon receipt of the order form, JIMC will retrieve, wrap, and transmit the product to
the users.
On the order form, users may request a one time delivery or a delivery with all
updates (subscription) of the material.
If a subscription is no longer needed, users must cancel the subscription.
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•If the required information is not available locally, is not found on an external
network or on the catalog, and JIMC cannot readily assist the user in locating the
data, use the specific functional area request for information (RFI) process to locate
the information. Users can identify to the functional manager that JBS is the desired
transmission means.
Sites should designate specific users who will be responsible for interacting with the
JIMC in order to facilitate data requests, provide feedback to the JIMC/EIMC, and
help minimize the administrative burden placed on the JIMC. Specific tasks include:
- Provide input to JIMC/EIMC on products that should be included on the catalog
- Identify video products desired and their sources
- Develop and propose content for the information domain as an information source
- Provide feedback to EIMC/JIMC/Sources on catalog entries.
D.2.1.1 Site System Administrator
A site system administrator will be required to perform certain technical duties
associated with BC2A. Until automation and systems integration is developed to the
point where users can get information from the BC2A directly to their work location,
the SSA will need to assist in the information management process to ensure users get
the information they need where they need it.
Upon receipt of data at the JBS site, the SSA transfers data to local servers and LANs.
Revises the server data lists to reflect receipt of data.
Based upon local commander guidance, may forward data to specific local LAN
users. Additionally, SSA may transfer the data to the media required by the user
(such as, SIPRNET, FAX, tactical net).
For further details on SSA duties, see the BC2A configuration management annex.
D.2.2 EUCOM Information Management Center
Publishes and periodically (at least annually) updates policies and procedures, in






Determines the overall dissemination priority structure. Resolves theater conflicts for
information and broadcast priority. Solicits feedback from users on effectiveness of
priority. Makes policy for priority and provides feedback to users on priority.
Reviews all requests for immediate and flash broadcast requests. This will be an
after-the-fact review of precedence use. Provides feedback to users on suspected
precedence inflation.
Approves the JBS video broadcast schedule and channel allocations.
Approves channel reallocation to support emergency broadcasts
Reviews and validates subscriptions. This review and validation will be after-the-
fact. Users may subscribe to products without EIMC approval. If a subscription is
disapproved, EIMC will notify the user and JIMC to cancel the subscription.
Coordinates with theater sources, components, and users to expand the BC2A catalog.
Reviews system performance metrics to ensure system meets customer needs. Works
with users, JIMC and BMC to improve information flow and procedures. Provides
feedback to DISA for suspected/identified system deficiencies.
Approves and "sponsors" information that, although not requested by specific users,
sources want to be made available to theater users. EIMC will submit order form to
JIMC for information it is "sponsoring."
Defines and approves a standard order form for requesting data from the catalog.
Defines and approves a standard format for meta data for catalog entries. Works with
users, JIMC, and BC2A program office to develop a standard user interface.
If a user or community of users require special assistance in getting information fast,
the EIMC will validate this requirement and assist in the process. For example, if a
combat search and rescue mission requires the normal broadcast schedule to be
suspended, the EIMC (or ETCC after hours) will assist in "clearing the system" to
facilitate operational high priority traffic.
Establishes Memorandums of Agreement with theater sources to provide meta data
for catalog and access to source data.
Coordinates with JIMC as it develops MOAs with CONUS sources for accessing and
controlling information retrieval and distribution.






Ensures that no information is broadcast to theater that is not requested by a user or
approved by EIMC (e.g. "sponsored" information). ETCC will be approval authority
for after hours emergency broadcasts.
Coordinates JBS broadcast with the Broadcast Management Center.
Publishes and periodically updates an information product catalog as sources identify
new information products and other sources are identified. Updates to the catalog
will be based on input from the EIMC, EUCOM theater users, information sources,
and other users.
Develops links to sources (i.e. works with sources to make sure physical links exist).
Prepares products for broadcast when requested by user (this process to be
automated).
Provides a catalog search engine to theater users.
Works with EIMC and sources to standardize user interface.
Conducts marketing with the sources to encourage them to populate catalog and
support the program. Looks for data and video information on Intelink-S and other
sources that may be useful and find ways to incorporate into BC2A.
Maintains statistical information on system utilization. The JIMC will provide
statistics to the EIMC on a regular basis.
Develops, in coordination with the EIMC, MOAs with CONUS sources for accessing
and controlling information retrieval and distribution.
Assists user with accessing information. Responds to problems with catalog use.
Provides the EIMC with updates on the status of user help requests. Keeps track of
frequently asked questions and develops and promulgates lessons learned to users.
Fills user information orders; both one time requests and subscriptions (i.e. one time
broadcasts plus updates).
Broadcasts recurring "activity reports" so users know what's been broadcast.
Responds to user requests for activity reports for past periods to provide users
visibility into system activity during periods of local outages.
Works with sources and network managers to ensure compliance with security
requirements relating to the dissemination of broadcast information.
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• Maintains a capability to rebroadcast information as required by users. Rebroadcast
of video is dependent upon availability of product from source.
• Works with BMC to acquire video broadcast licenses.
D.2.4 JBS Broadcast Management Center
• Generates and publishes the Video Broadcast Guide and disseminates it via the JBS to
users.
• Broadcasts video and digital information provided to the uplink.
• Coordinates with commercial video sources to obtain licenses for JBS broadcast.
• Coordinates for delivery of video products from the source.
• Interfaces with all video sources for broadcast over the JBS.
• Maintains the JBS uplink and provides broadcast alert notices over video for system
status, emergencies, weather bulletins, etc.
• Responds to EIMC via JIMC for request of special broadcasts.
• Collects network use and capacity statistics, and provides them to the JIMC.
D.2.5 Theater Injection Site
Equipment is installed at RAF Molesworth that is connected to the DISN LES at a 45
Mbps data rate. This equipment includes software capable of wrapping data files for
direct injection into the JBS. This provides a virtual injection capability in theater. The
future use of this capability will rely on software development to automatically wrap and
transmit data that is transmitted to the TIS from theater sources. The JAC can use this
capability today to wrap and inject their own products. It is not EUCOM's intention to
place the burden of wrapping and injecting files from other data sources. Until the
software can support this requirement, theater sources other than the JAC will have to
transmit their products to the JIMC for broadcast.
• The Joint Analysis Center wraps and transmits intelligence data products
produced by or stored at the JAC to the BMC for broadcast.
• The JAC must send a report to JIMC on products they transmit to ensure products
injected from Molesworth are included in the activity report. This requirement
must be automated as soon as possible.
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• Provides injection of video products from theater (e.g., Predator)
• When system is automated, data from other theater sources can be routed through
the theater injection computer to be wrapped and forwarded to the BMC for
broadcast. This process must also include a notice to JIMC to ensure files
injected will be included on the activity report.
D.2.6 Information Sources/Production Sites
Sources within and outside of theater should make their products available through the
BC2A network. Specific user needs/requests may require sources to make available for
broadcast such products as answers to requests for information, OPLANs, administrative
publications, etc. Virtually all organizations to include users are a potential source of
information (e.g., unit on-station reports)
• Supports information requests from the JIMC.
• Provides catalog meta data entries in format determined by EIMC. Ensures
consistency of structure and format for each product or product update or ensures
necessary changes are reflected in an update to the MOA.
• Develops MOAs with the JIMC or EIMC, as required, for providing catalog entries
and transmitting products to the JIMC for wrapping and broadcast. Provides meta
data, abstracts, key words, required applications and develops the data catalog in
accordance with standard catalog format to assist users in accessing and using the
information.
• Posts new and updated products in accordance with the MOA. Makes product
updates available immediately.
• Are responsible for the release of their information.
• Ensures information products adhere to security specifications agreed to in the MOA
and that all products are appropriately marked when viewed from the user's point of
access.
3. Precedence
The BC2A provides large data pipes for rapid dissemination of video and large data files
to all users. The approved precedence levels will be:
• Routine - normal mode of operation
• Immediate - for products needed immediately; requires minimum 0-6 approval or
approval by the senior watch/duty officer.
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• Flash - for urgent requirements; requires minimum 0-7 approval or approval by
senior watch/duty officer.
For precedence to work, use of "immediate" and "flash" must be kept to a minimum to
avoid precedence inflation. EIMC will review all precedence broadcasts and provide
feedback to users on problems with precedence.
For contingency circumstances, the EIMC may suspend all precedence, and in extreme
cases, scheduled broadcasts. In this case, authority for assigning precedence will rest
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